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Sanctions will not solve the Iranian nuclear problem. 
However, sanctions have—and still may—contribute to 
a solution if  judiciously, strategically, and appropriately 
applied. This issue brief  examines the role played by 
sanctions in creating the economic conditions necessary 
to compel Iran to seek negotiations on its nuclear 
program. It reviews the logic of  sanctions and how they 
can be best calibrated to achieve desired effects, drawing 
on lessons from past sanctions experience. It then offers 
recommendations on how a “Plan B” sanctions approach 
could be crafted.
In short, the paper finds: 
• The best way to design new sanctions against 
Iran is to ensure that they meet three basic 
criteria:
1. Structured to maximize the right pain on 
Iran;
2. Enforceable but impactful even with less 
than perfect compliance; and,
3. Designed to engender multilateral 
support.
• Sanctions and sanctions-related steps do exist 
that generally meet these criteria.  They are:
1. Reduce and eventually cut off  all purchases 
of  any Iranian oil or oil-related products.
2. Prohibit any purchases of  any Iranian 
non-oil exports.
3. Permit continued humanitarian transfers 
to Iran as well as the export to Iran of  
finished consumer goods, information 
technology, and luxury items.
4. Prohibit the export to Iran of  any goods not 
explicitly permitted within the categories 
above and regardless as to which sector of  
Iran’s economy it is destined.
5. Prohibit cargo carriers providing service 
to Iran for the export of  its goods
• US success in implementing sanctions 
along these lines will depend greatly on 
partner support, which will be risked if  the 
sanctions path is embarked upon without 
adequate testing of  a realistic and reasonable 
comprehensive solution via negotiations. 
Permitting the ongoing process to play out 
is essential.
• The Administration and Congress ought to 
begin contingency planning for new sanctions 
along these lines now, but without crossing 
the line into formal drafting of  bills or similar 
steps that would undermine negotiations 
(aside from steps such as removing restrictions 
on the export of  US crude oil, which could 
assuage concerns about future market 
impact). A quiet, internal process ought to be 
initiated along these lines. The focus ought to 
be on the substance of  sanctions, the efficacy 
of  a common US strategy, and the imperative 
of  stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear 
weapon rather than on meaningless displays 
of  tough talk or snapping up headlines.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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INTRODUCTION
US efforts to resolve international concerns with Iran’s 
nuclear program over the past ten years have focused 
on the concept of  a “dual track” policy. In this policy, 
negotiations with Iran have been the primary track, with 
sanctions and other forms of  pressure serving as the 
second track, in support of  the first. 
From one perspective, the pressure track has been very 
successful in catalyzing the current negotiating process. 
The Iranians argue to the contrary, but sanctions brought 
them to the negotiating table with the United States and 
its partners in the P5+1 (which also includes China, 
France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom, 
as coordinated by the European Union) or—at a 
minimum—created the economic situation necessary 
to have brought President Rouhani to office, along with 
officials interested in pursuing a deal. It is otherwise 
difficult to understand the Iranian government’s 
decision—and Supreme Leader’s acquiescence—to start 
the diplomatic process now underway after years of  
Iranian statements that they would never negotiate on 
their nuclear program. But sanctions have yet to compel 
Iran to accept the compromises necessary to secure an 
agreement. Some have suggested that this means the 
pressure we have mounted has been insufficient and, 
indeed, that with more pressure, Iran would not only 
accept the current P5+1 approach but also further 
and deeper restrictions on its nuclear program. Others 
question whether any amount of  pressure would ever be 
enough to prompt Iranian capitulation. This author joins 
those skeptical that enhanced pressure could achieve 
such a result. 
As noted in a previous policy brief, the history of  Iran’s 
nuclear program is one of  an escalating spiral of  move-
countermove. Though it is certainly true that one of  
the outcomes of  this spiral has been a badly mauled 
Iranian economy, the Iranian nuclear program has been 
a beneficiary of  more time to march forward in a drive to 
create a nuclear fait accompli. Having finally achieved a 
situation in which both sides agree that further escalation 
is in neither side’s interest, an ideal policy outcome would 
therefore be for a mutually agreeable, comprehensive 
arrangement to be reached now.
It is possible, however, that no such outcome will be 
forthcoming, even if  talks are permitted to come to their 
natural end rather than be curtailed by jingoism from 
Washington. In that circumstance, the President will 
have to decide how he wishes to continue US efforts to 
prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The US 
“Plan B” could go in a number of  different directions—
from covert action against Iran’s nuclear program 
to efforts that seek to marginalize and box in Iran 
throughout the region to sanctions—and probably will 
include a mix of  many different tools. But, as both the 
President and the Congress have indicated, strengthened 
and expanded sanctions will play a major role in the US 
response.
Given that Iran’s nuclear program has already advanced 
significantly toward the kind of  size and scope necessary 
to stage a weapons-focused breakout, the package will 
have to be implemented quickly, efficiently, and with 
international support. Designing the sanctions package 
for “Plan B” is therefore of  the utmost importance. 
This briefing begins with a review of  the existing range 
of  US and multilateral sanctions presently in place 
against Iran. It then outlines what the goals of  a “Plan 
B” sanctions campaign ought to be and the criteria with 
which the campaign should be designed, identifying 
core Iranian vulnerabilities along the way. It concludes 
with a list of  potential sanctions options, and specific 
suggestions about how the provisions ought to be 
developed, sold to partners, and enforced.*
__________________
*It is also worth noting that these Plan B measures could also form the basis of  a ready-to-use set of  sanctions to be deployed 
in the event of  a future Iranian attempt at breakout.
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REVIEW OF CURRENT US AND MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS
The United States and its international partners have 
made Iran a global economic pariah through a steady 
campaign to isolate and close off  Iran’s avenues for 
economic opportunity. 
The United States began this effort through its own 
unilateral embargo, which has been both strengthened 
and eased repeatedly since 1979. In the mid-1990s, the 
US national embargo grew to include all trade with 
Iran except for limited humanitarian goods, essentially 
cutting off  the Iranian and US economies from that 
point forward. This isolated Iran from the United States, 
but not the rest of  the world, with which Iran had 
decent trade ties that improved throughout the 1990s. 
Fearing the empowerment of  an Iran still committed to 
sponsorship of  terrorism and also pursuing weapons of  
mass destruction, the US campaign to isolate Iran from 
the broader international community began in earnest 
in 1996, with the passage of  what was then called the 
Iran–Libya Sanctions Act or ILSA. This law, among 
other things, made it sanctionable in the United States 
for any foreign company to provide assistance to Iran 
in the development of  its oil and gas sector. Coming as 
it did at roughly the same time as the Helms-Burton act 
against Cuba, it prompted outrage from US international 
partners as an extraterritorial application of  US law. 
Europe was particularly aggrieved, and in 1996, the EU 
passed legislation that forbade European companies 
from complying with the sanctions laws passed by non-
European jurisdictions.1 The Clinton Administration, 
seeing the risks that would be created to its larger 
foreign policy interests, reached an accommodation 
with the Europeans in May 1998, when then-Secretary 
of  State Madeline Albright issued a statement on the 
Administration’s decision to waive the application of  
sanctions on Total (France), Gazprom (Russia), and 
Petronas (Malaysia) for investment in Iran’s oil fields, 
citing the cooperation that the United States was 
receiving from the three countries in dealing with the 
challenges from Iran in a different way. This approach 
was, in effect, supported by the Bush Administration 
through its inaction against ILSA violators throughout 
the president’s two terms.
Sanctions against Iran remained largely static between 
1996 and 2006. Measures were imposed against Iranian 
individuals and entities—the term of  art is that they 
were “designated” for sanctions—for a variety of  ills, 
including proliferation and support for terrorism. But 
there was no systemic attempt to use sanctions as a major 
tool of  policy to deal with the proliferation problem in 
Iran until 2006, when US efforts changed the situation in 
two significant ways. 
1. First, the United States worked with its 
partners in the P5+1 to adopt the first in what 
became four UN Security Council resolutions 
(UNSCRs) to impose sanctions against Iran. 
This first resolution, UNSCR 1737, created the 
foundation upon which future UN sanctions 
would be built.
2. Second, and perhaps most important in the long 
term, the United States undertook a campaign 
of  unilateral designations and sanctions 
measures, using UNSCR 1737’s implementation 
as a justification and impetus to persuade other 
jurisdictions to take their own actions. The 
United States argued that the measures it was 
taking were necessary in order to achieve the 
stated purposes of  UNSCR 1737 and pointed 
to a number of  provisions in UNSCR 1737 
that suggested that UN member states had a 
responsibility to impose further measures to that 
end.
This effort resulted in approximately six years of  activist 
US sanctions policy, accompanied by the steps taken by 
the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Canada, and 
Australia, among others. All manner of  designations 
and sanctions actions were undertaken on the basis of  
reinforcing the UN sanctions structure, including:
• Asset freezes against and prohibitions on 
transactions with most of  Iran’s state-owned 
banks;
• Asset freezes against and prohibitions on 
transactions with Iran’s state-owned airlines, 
shipping companies, and economic service 
suppliers (such as insurance);
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• Prohibitions on trade with Iran in refined 
petroleum, petrochemicals, and other export 
revenue-generating industries; and,
• Severing of  other economic ties, such as export 
credits and investment, that created access to 
Iran to the international economy and normalcy 
for trade with Iran.
Each of  these steps contributed to rising pressure on 
the Iranian government to seek a diplomatic solution 
to international concerns with its nuclear program. 
However, perhaps no measure had as powerful a 
systemic impact as the threat to apply “secondary” 
sanctions against those who conduct transactions for 
or with those Iranian individuals and entities that the 
United States had designated itself. First codified in 
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act of  2010 (CISADA) and updated several 
times since, this secondary sanctions framework created 
the disincentive structure that has been credited in 
confronting international business with a stark choice: 
you can either do business in the United States or you 
can do business in Iran, but not both. Faced with such a 
choice, most major businesses and financial institutions 
chose to cut their ties with Iran rather than risk their 
access to the United States.
Despite this success, by the end of  2011, Iran’s 
international trade was still growing. This was due 
almost entirely to its oil industry. Indeed, an analysis of  
Iran’s economy prior to the imposition of  oil sanctions 
in December 2011 shows that throughout the US 
sanctions campaign, Iran continued to reap the benefits 
of  relatively high oil prices and the global need for the 
commodity. The downward blip in Iranian export data in 
2008–2009 corresponds almost exactly with the drop in 
oil prices around the time of  the 2008 financial crisis, and 
as oil prices returned, so too did Iranian export earnings. 
Figure 1: Comparison of  Iranian exports and the price of  oil from 2005-2013
Source: Data from the International Monetary Fund, extracted on February 23, 2015.
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Until late 2011, the United States and its partners had 
steered clear of  targeting Iran’s oil exports. They were 
judged to be, first, too important to the global economy 
and, second, too difficult to target with sanctions to be 
part of  the overall sanctions effort. Instead, the United 
States sought to reduce Iranian oil exports through 
“bank shots,” such as the targeting of  Iran’s banks, 
financial ties, and foreign investment. Surprisingly, given 
the actual impact, the sanctions imposed against Iran’s 
Central Bank of  Iran (CBI) in December 2011’s National 
Defense Authorization Act of  2012 (NDAA) were more 
of  the same. These sanctions sought to isolate the CBI 
for, in the words of  Senator Bob Menendez (one of  
the principal architects of  the sanctions): “[complicity] 
in Iran’s nuclear venture, financing the Iranian effort 
to acquire the knowledge, materials, and facilities to 
enrich uranium and to ultimately develop weapons of  
mass destruction; assisting the Iranian government in 
the evasion of  multilateral sanctions; and engaging in 
deceptive financial practices and illicit transactions.” 
Iran’s oil sales were naturally an intended target of  the 
measure, but there was shared interest among all parties, 
including the measure’s supporters in Congress, that the 
sanctions not spook global oil markets. The history of  
the provision and surrounding debate demonstrates that, 
from the bill’s first drafting in early November 2011 to 
its final form in December, there were several attempts 
made to soften the blow to Iran’s oil exports and to give 
the Obama Administration the ability to control how 
much of  an impact sanctions should have on global oil 
markets. 
This underscores what was, at the time, tremendous 
uncertainty about whether and how best to target Iran’s 
oil sales within the confines of  what the international 
community would support and what the oil market could 
bear. Some sanctions proponents argued that, instead of  
using the CBI sanctions measure, the focus of  sanctions 
on Iran’s oil sector ought to be targeted on transactions 
that support the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC)2  or on reducing the price that Iran was able to 
command for its oil exports.3  In the end, the language 
of  the NDAA was such that it did not directly require 
the reduction in oil purchases from Iran by its current 
customers. Instead, it simply laid out a choice: such 
purchases could be made, but without reductions, the 
bank facilitating the purchases would be subject to a cut-
off  of  financial ties with the United States (and, over 
time, the scope of  who could be subject to sanctions and 
what kinds of  transactions could lead to sanctions has 
been broadened to more directly target oil purchasers). 
Europe’s own decision to impose an oil import ban 
on Iran helped to demonstrate to Iran’s other trading 
partners that reducing imports was achievable and would 
not be undercut by competitors (which continues to be 
a major issue in East Asia’s stance on Iran oil imports).
This measure proved to be very effective: as noted in 
our previous issue brief “Implications of  New Oil 
Sanctions on Iran,” the result is that, from 2012–
2013, Iran’s economy cratered. According to the World 
Bank, Iran experienced a GDP contraction of  5.8 
percent during those years, and by a further 1.7 percent 
in 2013–2014.4 Unemployment hovered around 13 
percent according to official statistics—with suspicion 
abounding that it was higher than 20 percent—and 
overall economic participation figures remained around 
37 percent.5 Inflation reached 30–40 percent, again 
according to official statistics.6
However, this was not the only set of  sanctions 
imposed on Iran from 2012–2013. During this period, 
the United States and its partners added new measures 
that stigmatized business with Iran, particularly if  it 
involved any companies associated with the IRGC, and 
began to target other Iranian export sectors, such as 
the automotive industry, and means of  supporting the 
Iranian currency (the rial), including forbidding Iran from 
procuring gold and US dollars. These measures served 
to put international business and Iranian policymakers 
on notice that the sanctions program would no longer 
target core aspects of  Iran’s economy and government 
revenue, but would more generally undermine the Iranian 
economy. In truth, they were intended not only to blunt 
Iran’s nuclear drive, but also to demonstrate the lengths 
to which the United States was prepared to go to harm 
Iran’s economy in service of  this objective. 
The complex interconnections of  international sanctions 
are difficult to lay out graphically, but the following 
table describes the overall picture of  US sanctions 
on Iran, divided between those that are “primary” in 
nature (affecting only US persons) and those that are 
“secondary” in nature (affecting foreign persons’ access 
to the United States):
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US Primary Sanctions
US persons are generally prohibited from engaging in trade with Iran across any sectors except for those that 
have been opened as part of  a General License or if  specifically authorized via a Specific License issued by the 
Office of  Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) at the Department of  the Treasury. Those sectors that are subject 
to a General License include trade in food, agriculture, medicine, medical devices, and personal information 
technology. More information on the US licensing process can be found on OFAC’s website at: http://www.
treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/default.aspx.
US Secondary Sanctions
Foreign entities and people can be subject to US sanctions across a range of  possible options if  they conduct 
transactions with Iran as outlined below. 
The result of  this sanctions buildup is a structure of  interlocking pieces that, collectively, have isolated Iran as a general 
matter from the international economy and undermined its ability to develop normally.
Energy Exports 
from Iran
It is sanctionable to purchase Iranian petroleum products or to conduct transactions that facilitate the purchase of Iranian 
petroleum products. Sanctions are excepted for those who purchase crude oil in state jurisdictions that the United States 
determines have reduced their overall purchases of crude oil over the past 180 days, though this provision has been 
suspended per the JPOA; so long as countries maintain and do not exceed their December 2013–January 2014 oil 
purchase levels, sanctions will not be imposed.
It is not sanctionable to purchase natural gas from Iran. It is, however, sanctionable to facilitate Iran’s development 
of its natural gas infrastructure. It is similarly sanctionable to facilitate Iran’s development of its broader oil and gas 
infrastructure, or to provide technical services in support of it. 
Energy Exports 
to Iran
It is sanctionable to export to Iran any refined petroleum product. This includes gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and other related 
products.
Transportation
It is sanctionable to conduct transactions on the behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), Iran Air, or 
other designated Iranian transportation firms or port operators (such as Tidewater, sanctioned in June 2011). It is similarly 
sanctionable to assist Iran in the development of its ports, though exceptions may apply in specific cases.
Financial
It is sanctionable to conduct financial transactions on behalf of a whole range of Iranian financial institutions and other 
entities, or to provide dollars to Iran. It is also sanctionable to make available gold and precious metals to Iran, though 
this measure has been suspended as part of the JPOA. 
A variety of other financial services with Iran are also subject to sanctions, the most important of which is the provision of 
insurance. However, sanctions on these services have been suspended if the transactions are necessary to support other 
aspects of the JPOA.
It is also sanctionable to facilitate the transactions of the Central Bank of Iran, unless these transactions are conducted in 
jurisdictions in which oil reductions took place and for which exceptions have been granted, or if necessary to support the 
repatriation of Iranian assets as required under the JPOA
Industrial
It is sanctionable to provide to Iran any assistance with the development of its petrochemical industry. It is similarly 
sanctionable to purchase Iranian petrochemicals as a general matter, though these sanctions have been suspended by 
the United States as part of the JPOA.
It is sanctionable to provide Iran with any assistance for the development of its automotive industry. However, as with the 
petrochemical sector, these sanctions have been suspended by the United States as part of the JPOA.
Proliferation
It is sanctionable to provide Iran with assistance in the development of its nuclear program, its ballistic missile program, 
or with activities that could support Iranian chemical and biological weapons’ capability. This includes transactions with a 
number of specific individuals and entities, as well as through the provision of technology.
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IRANIAN VULNERABILITIES AND GOALS OF A “PLAN B” 
SANCTIONS CAMPAIGN
As people contemplate a renewed international sanctions 
campaign against Iran, logical questions to ask are: 
What’s left? And, if  that all didn’t work, why would more 
sanctions work now?
As noted above, if  negotiations fail, the decision to 
restart the sanctions campaign is fraught with risk but 
probably inevitable. In the event that talks ended, Iran 
would doubtless expand its nuclear program, albeit 
perhaps in more defensible ways than immediately 
producing highly enriched uranium. It is reasonable to 
expect that Iran would start some of  the thousands of  
centrifuges presently in stand-by mode as well as restart 
the construction of  the Arak heavy water research 
reactor, end the extra transparency steps created through 
the Joint Plan of  Action (JPOA) and generally seek to 
return to the status quo ante. The President would need 
to respond in turn and in kind by seeking to expand the 
US sanctions regime against Iran. President Obama has 
already made clear that this would be part of  his response 
to an Iranian rejection of  a comprehensive solution to 
the nuclear issue, and certainly the US Congress would 
be prepared to act independently to ensure that this is 
the case. 
The issue, therefore, is not whether more sanctions 
would result from a collapse in the talks, but rather what 
they would look like and how can they be shaped to 
be most effective in creating costs on Iran and, ideally, 
steering them back to the negotiating table.
The present sanctions bills being debated in Congress 
show a distressing desire to simply “do more of  the same” 
against Iran by focusing on seeking further reductions 
of  Iran’s oil exports and imposing sanctions on support 
for “strategic sectors” of  the Iranian economy. There 
are also provisions for expanding the number of  Iranian 
individuals subject to US sanctions, though from a 
strategic standpoint, such measures probably would have 
little value in the context of  an overall damaged Iranian 
economy. 
Given that Iran’s economy is subject to some of  the most 
intensive and extensive sanctions measures ever devised, 
with overlapping authorities contributing to the spider 
web–like feel of  the Iran sanctions program built by the 
United States, it is perhaps not surprising that there is 
little new in present sanctions bills. There are no easy, 
open targets for additional sanctions pressure: indeed, as 
outlined in our last policy briefing on the subject, even 
the previously successful oil reduction effort cannot be 
guaranteed to have the same impact today as it once did 
because the primary damage of  the oil measures has 
already been inflicted. That said, Iran continues to have 
interests that can be damaged with more sanctions.
Any future sanctions effort should be designed with the 
following three concepts in mind:
1. Structured to maximize the right pain on Iran;
2. Enforceable but impactful even with less than 
perfect compliance; and,
3. Designed to engender multilateral support.
Arguably, it is these three principles that made the 2012–
2013 sanctions period as successful as it was and far 
more successful than similar sanctions drives over the 
preceding twenty years. Take, for example, the sanctions 
on Iran’s oil and gas sector since 1996. As noted above, 
they fall into three rough categories:
• Denial of  assistance and support for domestic 
industry;
• Prohibition on Iranian imports of  refined 
petroleum; and,
• Sanctions threatened on those who import 
Iranian petroleum products.
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Source: US Energy Information Administration.
The first set of  measures arguably contributed to Iran’s 
flatlining oil production from 2000 until sanctions 
forced Iran to scale back production in 2012–2014. But, 
these measures did not force Iran to seek a negotiated 
outcome to its nuclear program in a serious fashion. 
While they were in place, Iran’s economy continued 
to grow and Iran resisted talks and serious progress in 
resolving the nuclear issue. The second set of  measures 
certainly imposed costs on Iran, forcing it to convert 
petrochemical plants into gasoline refineries of  overall 
poor quality, creating pollution and economic dislocation 
in the process. However, these measures too failed to 
bring Iran to the table in a serious fashion. Only when 
Iran lost access to its vast oil revenues as a result of  US 
efforts from 2012–2013—and at a time when the Iranian 
government was seeking to reform its national subsidy 
programs, which was a cash-intensive enterprise—did 
Iran sue for a negotiated outcome and engage in the 
current diplomatic process. 
Of  course, such an articulation of  the value of  the oil 
sanctions imposed by the United States is reductionist to 
the extreme, leaving aside such critical elements as Iran’s 
own internal politics and the return to office of  a relatively 
pragmatic group of  technocrats under President Rouhani; 
the mounting accumulation of  pain caused by decades 
of  sanctions and economic mismanagement (most 
pronounced under the Ahmadinejad administration, 
which squandered a fortune in oil sales at high prices 
over most of  his term); and the growing chorus of  
international voices urging Iran to seek a deal with the 
West. Moreover, this argument leaves aside entirely the 
idea that Western accommodations also were necessary in 
order for negotiations to start in earnest, beginning with 
recognition on the part of  the United States that a long-
term deal might involve Iranian uranium enrichment at 
home. 
These important caveats aside, the 2012¬–2013 pressure 
campaign highlights that it is possible to impose sanctions 
that meet the standards outlined above:
1. Right pain: The sanctions isolated a particular 
vulnerability of  Iran that deprived it of  access 
to government revenues at a time when the 
government needed them.
2. “Good enough” compliance: Sanctions 
created pressure on Iran even when smuggling 
took place and when there was considerable 
month-to-month variation in purchase levels by 
Iran’s customers, due to the scale of  the damage 
being imposed overall.
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3. Respectful of  partners’ interests: The United 
States was able to communicate to its partners 
that it could respect their national energy 
interests by working with them to identify 
particular oil purchase targets, and then granting 
them exceptions to US sanctions when met. 
These three principles work and can be used again to 
frame a renewed sanctions campaign, assuming that the 
decision is reached to reinvigorate the process if  the 
talks collapse.
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SUGGESTED STEPS TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE
Below are five sanctions proposals that are offered with 
these principles in mind. They are intended to be part of  
an integrated approach, combining sanctions steps as well 
as sanctions to be avoided.  They also generally describe 
targets for sanctions, not necessarily the best tools to 
achieve them or the consequences that would befall 
violators, which—to some extent—are beside the point 
so long as they are severe enough to deter trespassers. 
This assessment assumes that the United States would 
continue to engage in its usual practice of  combining 
multiple different sanctions options to enforce the steps 
described below. In other words, the United States would 
put at risk banks that finance transactions, insurers who 
indemnify the cargoes, exporters who sell the goods, 
and service providers who grease the path for the 
sanctioned goods to get from place to place. Further, 
unless indicated otherwise, each of  the below options 
are for the US application of  secondary sanctions against 
Iran. Naturally, a core US diplomatic goal would be to 
persuade as many countries as possible to enact similar 
provisions. However, failing that, use of  secondary 
pressure from the United States may have the desired 
effect, albeit with increasingly poor results the more the 
United States is seen as the less reasonable party in the 
dispute. The options are:
1. Reduce and eventually cut off  all purchases 
of  any Iranian oil or oil-related products. 
 
This measure is very similar to what is proposed 
in the current text of  S. 269, which would 
involve an initial 30 percent reduction, followed 
by purchases limited to a de minimis level, 
without further clarification. However, here we 
suggest going for deeper, clearer purchase levels 
by establishing a requirement for a 50 percent 
reduction in Iranian oil purchases by the first year 
after sanctions are imposed. The requirement 
would be to go to zero purchases the year after that, 
creating a two-year horizon for Iranian oil sales. 
 
As noted in the previous policy briefing, this 
would not be sufficient to change Iran’s calculus, 
but it is an important step to be taken to support 
that endeavor. 
2. Prohibit any purchases of  any Iranian non-
oil exports.
 
At present, the secondary sanctions regime 
against Iran is focused on a few identified 
industries. This was intentional, reflecting a 
desire to demonstrate proportionality behind US 
sanctions and to try to maintain a tie between 
the sanctions imposed and Iran’s nuclear 
program. However, as this assessment starts 
with an assumption that talks to persuade Iran 
to address concerns with its nuclear program 
have failed, this tie would be less important for 
a future sanctions campaign. Implementation 
of  such a prohibition would be challenging to 
say the least, if  one assumes the objective is 
to create an export vacuum and that anything 
less than perfect success is unacceptable. This 
assessment rejects such an objective. The goal 
is to drive Iran from the international market 
in anything beyond a smuggling capacity and to 
force it to use the most inconvenient, difficult, 
and expensive options to try to export its goods. 
Smuggling simply cannot provide the kind of  
foreign exchange that a country of  70 million 
people would require to continue importing the 
goods it desires. 
3. Permit continued humanitarian 
transfers to Iran as well as the export 
to Iran of  finished consumer goods, 
information technology, and luxury items. 
 
It remains a core US interest to keep food, 
medicine, medical devices, and similar items 
flowing into Iran. This should include keeping 
active the humanitarian channel established in 
the Joint Plan of  Action. There is nothing about 
the channel that exceeds what Congress already 
permitted in various sanctions laws; therefore, 
it cannot be argued that the channel grants Iran 
undue relief. To the contrary, so long as the 
target of  pressure is the Iranian government, 
it is in the US national interest to make clear 
that the Iranian people are innocent bystanders. 
ISSUE BRIEF: A SANCTIONS APPROACH TO “PLAN B” FOR THE IRAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM
energypolicy.columbia.edu | MARCH 2015  | 13
That said, it is also not in the US interest to 
deny Iran the ability to waste its precious store 
of  foreign currency on nonessential goods. To 
the contrary, the United States should make 
sure that Iran’s elites can continue to purchase 
as many high-end cars as cargo container ships 
can carry and that normal consumer goods 
continue to be exported to Iran. Denying access 
to foreign-made refrigerators will not bring Iran 
to its knees, but permitting them to use precious 
hard currency on such items ties this up as a 
resource and ensures that Iran must prioritize 
among its various needs. Iran would probably 
sensibly prohibit such imports, but it should be 
the Iranians’ decision, and to them should fall 
the consequences of  it. 
4. Prohibit the export to Iran of  any goods 
not explicitly permitted within the 
categories above and regardless as to which 
sector of  Iran’s economy it is destined. 
 
Identifying strategic sectors of  Iran’s economy 
for sanctions made sense in a previous iteration 
of  the sanctions effort as noted above, but in 
this circumstance, the objectives of  US pressure 
would be different. In this circumstance, the 
US goal would be to undermine Iran’s ability 
to develop all of  its indigenous industry and to 
displace what is presently a significant import 
requirement. Eliminating wealth generation for 
Iran would also both ease the complication of  
enforcing the export prohibition and ensure 
that Iran’s foreign exchange is dedicated solely 
to providing for immediate humanitarian needs.
5. Prohibit cargo carriers providing service 
to Iran for the export of  its goods. 
 
Mindful of  the previous sanctions proposals, 
the United States should not seek a blanket 
prohibition on cargo carriers from journeying 
to Iran or, indeed, from carrying nonsanctioned 
cargo to it. Doing so would jeopardize 
humanitarian imports unnecessarily and to the 
US detriment. Instead, the approach ought to 
focus on a common-sense method: permit cargo 
carriers to travel to Iran, offload their legitimate 
cargo, and then inspect them visually upon 
departure to verify that they are not carrying 
new cargo of  any significance. If  they are 
detected doing so, sanctions inquiries can then 
be undertaken with their home governments and 
the operating companies. For those companies 
that violate this prohibition, there would need 
to be a severe penalty. One such penalty could 
be to prohibit the company operating the ship 
to conduct business at US ports for a year and 
to make a threat of  secondary consequences for 
foreign port operators that open their waters to 
ships from that company in the future. Such a 
threat would require captains and ship owners 
more generally to decide that the risk of  detection 
is slight—by engaging in only light smuggling—
or to forego the trade altogether. Past history 
suggests that, when faced with such a decision, 
most major companies elect to forego the trade. 
Taken in combination, these measures would create an 
Iran that is far poorer nationally but still technically 
capable of  feeding its people and averting a humanitarian 
crisis. Moreover, these measures would create a somewhat 
more reasonable enforcement standard than concepts 
of  quarantine that have been advanced by some, while 
offering a far more aggressive sanctions approach than 
what is presently on the table in the Senate.
But how do these measures stack up against the three 
criteria established earlier? 
1. Right Pain: Iran would find that it is unable 
to acquire the hard currency that it needs to 
maintain a sense of  economic normalcy while, 
at the same time, trade goods continued to flow 
into Iran for anyone capable of  buying them. 
2. “Good enough” compliance: 100 percent 
compliance for a massive sanctions project as 
envisioned here would not be achievable—but 
the scope and scale of  the effort would be such 
that even substantial leakage would be tolerable. 
If, for example, we take Iran’s export statistics 
for the past eleven months as a baseline—$46 
billion according to Iranian customs data7 
—then it would not be unreasonable for 
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even 10–20 percent of  that amount to be 
considered “leakage” and still not jeopardize the 
disproportionate impact of  such measures.
3. Respectful of  partners’ interests: There 
would doubtless be international partners that 
would lose as a result of  this effort, and the 
US government’s sanctions team would need to 
work exceptionally hard to assuage international 
concerns. That said, the primary economic 
consequences of  these six measures were 
calculated to fall on Iran:
a. Given current lower prices, there is less 
disincentive on economic grounds to walk 
away from Iran.  The United States could 
strengthen its economic arguments by 
removing restrictions on the export of  
US oil and condensates. As the Center on 
Global Energy Policy demonstrated with 
its January 2015 report “Navigating the 
US Oil Export Debate,” this policy is no 
longer sensible in light of  changes to the 
international oil market and US interest in it, 
and its presence undermines good arguments 
that present international oil supply is more 
than sufficient to compensate for the loss of  
Iranian exports.  
b. By permitting continued exports to Iran of  
most goods still permitted under sanctions, 
manufacturers in Iran’s present trading 
partners would not bear an immediate cost 
from loss of  Iran as a customer, at least until 
Iran itself  decides to walk away from the 
business; and,
c. By prohibiting Iranian exports more 
generally, some of  Iran’s trading partners 
would lose a valuable supply of  some cheap 
goods—such as cement, one of  Iran’s most 
valuable commodities at present—but hardly 
those for which Iran is the sole international 
source.
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WOULD PARTNERS REALLY SUPPORT SUCH AN EFFORT?
This last segment of  analysis bears more elaboration, as 
it implicitly argues that partners will support a strategy of  
sanctions retrenchment so long as the economics work 
properly for them. This is a gross oversimplification that 
requires further consideration.
As noted above, it is by no means certain that US partners 
will view the United States to be the more reasonable 
party in the event that talks collapse. The United States 
controls significant economic cards, but this should 
not be mistaken for control over global responses to 
a breakdown in the process. Doubtless, core US allies 
would support the US effort to restart the sanctions track. 
But the degree to which they join it will be dependent on 
both what pressure the United States is prepared to bring 
to bear on them and their own willingness to embark on 
the second track of  the strategy. Enthusiasm would be 
increased if  Iran were successfully portrayed as unable 
to come to a reasonable deal; conversely, the pressure 
track would experience new bumps if  the United States 
took the blame. 
Either way, it will take persuasion from Washington to 
get partners on board. Crafting smarter sanctions would 
help, but part of  the impetus will have to come from a 
realistic sense of  the consequences from having failed 
to join the United States in this endeavor and a clear 
sense from the United States as to the intended end 
game of  the sanctions. Clarity from Washington in the 
aftermath of  failed talks will be essential in any event, 
but particularly if  countries are going to be asked to 
forego their economic interests in the furtherance of  the 
cause.
Moreover, some countries may play spoiler roles. Russia is 
already poised to do so, having worked with Iran on an “oil 
for goods” arrangement that, while not yet in operation, 
could provide Iran with access to new revenues. Russia’s 
own economic position has deteriorated since the deal 
was first considered in January 2014, and details about 
what would be involved have been scant, confusing, 
and contradictory. But particularly if  talks end with 
some question as to who is to blame, the Russians and 
Iranians would probably pursue some kind of  economic 
arrangement as a way of  punishing Washington and 
seeking to avoid use of  the international economy. China 
and India, despite the existence of  reasonable alternative 
sources of  oil in the present price environment, may 
simply decide to keep with their purchases of  Iranian 
oil as a way of  maintaining diversity. And, of  course, 
Iran should be expected to offer discounts and other 
incentives to keep customers coming back. 
Altogether, it should not be assumed that, with a sour 
end to the ongoing negotiations, partners will see 
Washington’s suggested path forward as the most sensible 
and appropriate response. The international community 
wishes to see an end to the Iran nuclear issue, and the 
Iranian narrative of  excessive demands from the United 
States will be well-buttressed by the expansive pressure 
agenda outlined by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in 
his speech to Congress on March 3, as well the Iranian 
concern that any deal reached with the United States may 
have limited currency (reinforced by the now infamous 
letter of  forty-seven senators).
One way to help manage this would be to develop 
sanctions triggers that keep the onus on Iran rather 
than on the United States. The present concept is one 
of  a time-bound set of  triggers linked to Iranian failure 
to comply with deadlines rather than Iranian nuclear 
steps. This ought to be changed. A sensible link for any 
future sanctions would be to link them to any Iranian 
nuclear steps that go beyond the commitments reached 
in the Joint Plan of  Action. No new US nuclear-related 
sanctions would be therefore contemplated until Iran 
takes the first move. This is essential for demonstrating, 
once again, that the United States is not gleefully 
imposing sanctions but rather responding to Iranian bad 
acts.
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WOULD MORE SANCTIONS WORK?
Having outlined a possible new sanctions campaign, the 
question remains: would they work? 
This remains an open topic for debate. Certainly, Iran 
continues to have vulnerabilities, as outlined above. Iran 
remains a relatively large economy that still conducts 
international trade that can be hindered. Taking away 
the value of  Iran’s total non-oil exports from the first 
eleven months of  this Iranian fiscal year—valued at 
$48 billion by Iranian customs—would be of  a similar 
magnitude as the oil sanctions from 2012–2013, in 
which $54 billion in Iranian export revenue was erased. 
Iran’s large and sophisticated population has access to 
international media and therefore cannot be shielded 
from the realities of  Iranian economic life and their 
cause. Iranian President Rouhani’s own admission that 
Iran’s economy will not get better unless sanctions are 
overturned or overcome would be played back to him 
by his political opponents in the event a deal is not 
reached, if  for no other reason than to criticize his lack 
of  fortitude in the face of  international hostility and 
the resulting appearance of  weakness it has created. On 
this basis, there is some basis to assert that, with more 
sanctions, the pressure will grow on Rouhani and the 
broader political establishment to come to an accord 
with the P5+1. 
However, as noted previously, there is no guarantee of  
this outcome. From an analytical perspective, it may be 
just as likely that more sanctions pressure could spur 
Iran’s decision to pursue in earnest a nuclear weapon 
as it could spur Iran to capitulate. But certainly, it is 
also possible that sanctions will not work and that by 
doubling down on the sanctions track, the negotiating 
track will be foreclosed. In this circumstance, then—
even if  not immediately—Plan B would require 
developing a strategy intended to prosecute a military 
campaign against Iran intended to remove its immediate 
nuclear option. The Obama Administration has made 
clear that this is not a long-term solution to the problem 
and, indeed, could exacerbate the long-term strategic 
issues with Iran by incentivizing its acquisition of  
nuclear weapons as a deterrent. A renewed sanctions 
effort could therefore backfire catastrophically, 
particularly one as intense as described above. 
This does not argue in favor of  a smaller-scale approach 
to sanctions. If  Iran was unwilling to make adequate 
concessions on its nuclear program facing the pressure 
applied to date, would the loss of  a few additional billion 
per year in export revenue send the signal sought? Likely 
not. What instead ought to be the lesson of  the past 
several years is that: first, Iran’s resistance to sanctions 
pressure and overall economic resilience are quite 
substantial and that an equally substantial effort would 
need to be brought to bear; and, second, that all of  the 
pressure in the world may not force Iran to change its 
nuclear posture in a manner sufficient to placate P5+1 
concerns.
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WHERE SHOULD WE GO FROM HERE?
Ideally, the Administration and Congress should set 
aside their differences of  opinion on whether new 
sanctions are justified, appropriate, and useful at this 
juncture and instead focus on how best to design new 
sanctions, should the ongoing talks fail. Again ideally, 
the talks would be sufficiently supported by all sides 
of  our political process so that if  sanctions are to be 
entered into again, it is with reluctance and sobriety on 
their chances of  success but also with determination to 
be successful in reinforcing with Iran the consequences 
of  failing to reach a comprehensive solution.
The current atmosphere in Washington is far from ideal. 
However, it should still be possible for the Administration 
and Congress to begin preparing for the possible future 
contingency that talks are unsuccessful and that Iran 
cannot make the decisions that it needs to make to achieve 
a comprehensive solution. Contingency planning would 
therefore be entered into by the parties with a common 
agreement that, in exchange for confidentiality on all 
sides, there be a well-reasoned, judicious examination 
of  the various sanctions options available to the United 
States at this juncture. For the Administration, this would 
require bringing into the conversation experts on Iran’s 
economy, vulnerabilities, and political psychology, and an 
appreciation that the kind of  sanctions to be embarked 
upon in this next phase would likely go beyond present 
partner comfort zones. For Congress, this would require 
being prepared to consider carefully objections raised by 
the Administration to particular sanctions options not as 
weak-kneed subservience to international partnerhood 
but rather as well-founded concern with the risks that 
particular ideas might bring.
There is a model that both the Administration and 
Congress can look back to for cooperation on just such 
contingency planning, notwithstanding differences on 
timing of  sanctions and their scope: the 2009–2010 
negotiations on the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA). Though 
sometimes fraught with controversy and disagreement, 
the CISADA negotiations between Congress and 
the Administration demonstrated appreciation and 
understanding on the part of  both branches to their 
respective strategic, tactical, and political needs. In the 
end, a bill that substantially tightened sanctions while 
taking place in an organized and effective manner was 
drafted, developed, agreed, passed, and signed into law 
on a timeline that did not undermine ongoing diplomatic 
efforts—this time, with members of  the UN Security 
Council on a new sanctions resolution (1929)—and 
which instead made them more effective, inspiring 
similar actions to reinforce the UNSC by the European 
Union, Japan, Korea, Australia, Canada, and many other 
international partners. A similarly carefully orchestrated 
effort is probably beyond the hopes of  imagination 
in today’s partisan Washington, but it would be in the 
best interest of  the United States in confronting this 
challenge.
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CONCLUSION
Acknowledging the complications of  a renewed 
sanctions campaign may smack of  defeatism to 
some. However, these complications are important 
considerations as policymakers debate whether the deal 
presently being negotiated between the P5+1 and Iran 
is worth concluding. Effective, targeted sanctions with 
systemic impact have had the desired effect of  bringing 
Iran to the table. It is theoretically possible that, faced 
with regime survival through what would become in 
effect economic warfare, the Iranian government would 
be forced to make more severe accommodations to the 
international community on its nuclear program. 
However, this exercise reveals a still more important 
reality: that entering into the sanctions pressure track 
again in full is dangerous. It simply may not work because 
Iran is unwilling to bend under sanctions pressure. For 
this reason, it is far more in the US interest to avoid having 
to go back down this road and to solve this problem with 
a reasonable, serious, and sensible negotiated outcome 
out of  the ongoing process. If, however, more sanctions 
must be attempted, then we must be in the effort in order 
to achieve a dramatic turnaround, and this demands an 
even more aggressive sanctions approach than we have 
had in years past.
The problem is that, with the end of  talks, so too 
opportunities for de-escalation: both sides would 
increasingly find themselves forced to respond to 
more hawkish elements of  their own governments by 
reaffirming that they took a tough approach to the 
talks and are prepared to impose costs on the other 
side for their failure. This problem would probably get 
worse as time goes on and both sides get entrenched 
in their positions. We may find that the return to the 
sanctions path is far easier than finding new off-ramps 
to a diplomatic outcome. 
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The Kurdish Regional Government completed the 
construction and commenced crude exports in an 
independent export pipeline connecting KRG oilfields 
with the Turkish port of  Ceyhan. The first barrels of  
crude shipped via the new pipeline were loaded into 
tankers in May 2014. Threats of  legal action by Iraq’s 
central government have reportedly held back buyers 
to take delivery of  the cargoes so far. The pipeline can 
currently operate at a capacity of  300,000 b/d, but the 
Kurdish government plans to eventually ramp-up its 
capacity to 1 million b/d, as Kurdish oil production 
increases. 
Additionally, the country has two idle export pipelines 
connecting Iraq with the port city of  Banias in Syria and 
with Saudi Arabia across the Western Desert, but they 
have been out of  operation for well over a decade. The 
KRG can also export small volumes of  crude oil to Tur-
key via trucks. 

